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Blind quantum computation protocols allow a user to delegate a computation to a remote quantum computer
in such a way that the privacy of their computation is preserved, even from the device implementing the compu-
tation. To date, such protocols are only known for settings involving at least two quantum devices: either a user
with some quantum capabilities and a remote quantum server or two or more entangled but noncommunicating
servers. In this work, we take the first step towards the construction of a blind quantum computing protocol with
a completely classical client and single quantum server. Specifically, we show how a classical client can exploit
the ambiguity in the flow of information in measurement-based quantum computing to construct a protocol for
hiding critical aspects of a computation delegated to a remote quantum computer. This ambiguity arises due
to the fact that, for a fixed graph, there exist multiple choices of the input and output vertex sets that result
in deterministic measurement patterns consistent with the same fixed total ordering of vertices. This allows a
classical user, computing only measurement angles, to drive a measurement-based computation performed on a
remote device while hiding critical aspects of the computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale quantum computers offer the promise of quite
extreme computational advantages over conventional comput-
ing technologies for a range of problems spanning cryptanaly-
sis [1], simulation of physical systems [2], and machine learn-
ing [3]. Recently, however, a new application has emerged for
quantum computers: secure delegated computation [4].
Consider a user wishing to have a computation performed
on a remote server. Two main security concerns arising for
the user relate to the privacy and the correctness of the com-
putation. The privacy concern is that the description of their
computation, both the program and any input data, remains
hidden even from the server. The correctness concern is that a
malicious server might tamper with their computation, send-
ing them a misleading result: hence, ideally such behaviour
would be detectable. Quantum protocols have been proposed
that can mitigate both of these concerns. In the literature, pro-
tocols that allow for program and data privacy are known as
blind quantum computing protocols, while protocols that al-
low for correctness to be ensured with high probability are
known as verifiable quantum computing protocols [55].
The first blind quantum computing protocol was proposed
by Childs [5]. While functional, this scheme put a rather
heavy burden on the client’s side in terms of resources, with
the client required to control a quantum memory and to per-
form SWAP gates. A subsequent protocol, from Arrighi and
Salvail [6], introduced mechanisms for both verification and
blindness for a limited range of functions and can be seen
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as the start of an intimate link between blindness and veri-
fiability. This link was further established with the discov-
ery of the universal blind quantum computing (UBQC) proto-
col [7], which allows a client, equipped only with the ability
to produce single-qubit states, to delegate an arbitrary quan-
tum computation to a universal quantum server while making
it blind with unconditional security.
This scheme has been modified and extended several times
in the last few years, with works investigating robustness [8–
10], optimality [11–13], and issues related to physical imple-
mentations [14, 15]. Importantly, the blind computation pro-
tocols have proven a powerful tool in the construction of ver-
ifiable quantum computing protocols, with a number of pro-
tocols emerging in recent years based on the UBQC proto-
col [16–18] and on an alternative blind protocol from Mori-
mae and Fujii [19] in which the client performs single-qubit
measurements rather than state preparations [20–22]. The rel-
atively low overhead in such schemes has made it possible to
implement both blind and verifiable quantum computing pro-
tocols in quantum optics [23–25].
The question of verifiability, directly rather than as a con-
sequence of blindness, has also attracted attention. This prob-
lem was first studied by Aharonov et al. [26], who consid-
ered the use of a constant-sized quantum computer to verify a
larger device. Subsequent work by Broadbent [27] reduced
the requirements on the prover to mirror those used in the
UBQC protocol. An entirely distinct route to verification has
also emerged, which considers a classical user but requires
multiple entangled but noncommunicating servers [28, 29].
Surprisingly, perhaps, many of these schemes are also blind,
though often this was not the aim of the paper. In fact, only a
few examples of verifiable computing schemes exist that are
not naturally blind [30, 31], and it is tempting to conjecture a
fundamental link between blindness and verifiability.
The verification methods discussed above provide a very
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2strong form of certification, amounting to interactive proofs
for correctness which do not rely on any assumptions about
the functioning of the device to be tested. From an experi-
mental point of view, the first nonclassically simulable evolu-
tion of quantum systems will most likely be implemented by
means of nonuniversal quantum simulators rather than fully
universal quantum computers. Here, too, the problem arises of
certifying the correct functioning of a device [32] that cannot
be efficiently simulated. However, in this regime interactive
proofs have proven more difficult to construct. Nonetheless,
progress has been made in developing a range of certification
techniques for various physical systems. These include feasi-
ble quantum state tomography of matrix product states [33],
certification of the experimental preparation of resources for
photonic quantum technologies [34], certification of simula-
tors of frustration-free Hamiltonians [35], and derivation of a
statistical benchmark for boson sampling experiments [36].
A common feature among all blind quantum computing
protocols and interactive proofs of correctness for quantum
computation is that they require that at least two parties pos-
sess quantum capabilities. Removing this requirement and al-
lowing a purely classical user to interact with a single quan-
tum server would greatly expand the practicality of delegated
quantum computation since it would remove large-scale quan-
tum networks as a prerequisite for verifiability. In the present
work, we focus specifically on the question of blind computa-
tion with a completely classical client, but given the historic
links between progress in blindness and verification, it is nat-
ural to expect that progress in either direction will likely be
reflected in the other.
While it is presently unknown if such a protocol can exist,
a negative result in this context is a scheme-dependent impos-
sibility proof presented in Ref. [37]. There, the author consid-
ered a scenario where a classical user and a quantum server
exchange classical information in a two-step process. First,
the classical client encodes their description of the computa-
tion using an affine encryption scheme and then sends all the
classical encrypted data to the server. The server then per-
forms a quantum computation using the received data and re-
turns the classical output to the client who decrypts the re-
sult using their encryption key. For this setting, it was shown
that secure blind quantum computing cannot be achieved un-
less BPP = BQP (i.e., unless a classical computer can effi-
ciently simulate a quantum computer). While this is an inter-
esting result, it imposes strong assumptions on the operational
method of blind quantum computation with a classical client
and therefore does not seem to limit further studies in this di-
rection. Additionally, Aaronson et al. [38] have recently sug-
gested that information-theoretically blind quantum comput-
ing with a classical client is not likely to be possible because
the existence of such a scheme implies unlikely containments
between complexity classes. Additional implications that the
development of a classical-client blind-computation protocol
would have in complexity theory are discussed in Ref. [39].
Here, we provide evidence in the opposite direction. We
introduce a form of delegated quantum computation using
measurement-based quantum computing (MBQC) as the un-
derlying framework. This allows us to introduce a model-
specific protocol that achieves a satisfying degree of security
by directly exploiting the structure of MBQC. We show that
the classical communication received by the party performing
quantum operations is insufficient to reconstruct a description
of the computation. This insufficiency remains even when the
server is required only to identify the computation up to pre-
and post-processing by polynomial-sized classical computa-
tion, under plausible complexity-theoretic assumptions. We
call our scheme classically driven blind quantum computing
(CDBQC).
The paper is structured as follows: In Sec. II, to help the
readers unfamiliar with MBQC, we present a short introduc-
tion to this model of quantum computation. In Sec. III we
describe the steps of the CDBQC protocol. In Sec. IV we use
mutual information to analyse the degree of blindness for a
single round of the CDBQC protocol. In Sec. V we introduce
the concept of flow ambiguity and we show how this is used
by the client to hide information from the quantum server. Our
conclusions are presented in Sec. VI.
II. MEASUREMENT BASED QUANTUM COMPUTATION
In MBQC, a computation is performed by means of single-
qubit projective measurements that drive the quantum infor-
mation across a highly entangled resource state. The most
general resources for MBQC are graph states [40]. A graph
state is defined by a simple and undirected graph, i.e., a math-
ematical object G = (V, E) composed of a vertex set V and an
edge set E , with cardinality |V| and |E|, respectively. The ver-
tices of the graph represent the qubits, while their interactions
are symbolized by the edges. A graph state |G〉 is an N -qubit
state, where N = |V|. Each qubit is initialized in the state
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and then entangled with its neighbors
by controlled-Z gates, CˆZ i,j = |0〉〈0|i ⊗ Iˆj + |1〉〈1|i ⊗ Zˆj ,
where Iˆ and Zˆ are the single-qubit identity and Pauli-Z gate
respectively. Explicitly, |G〉 = ∏(i,j)∈E CˆZ i,j |+〉⊗N . Equiv-
alently, a graph state |G〉 can be defined by the stabilizer rela-
tions Kˆv|G〉 = |G〉, with stabilizers [40]
Kˆv = Xˆv
∏
w∈N (v)
Zˆw, ∀v ∈ V, (1)
where N (v) denotes the neighborhood of v in G. Without
loss of generality, the vertices in G can be labeled (1, . . . , N)
in the order that the corresponding qubits are to be measured.
We take this ordering to be implicit in the definition of the
graph, for example as the order in which the vertices appear
in the adjacency matrix for G. It is also useful to define a
specific type of graph state that will be used later. AnN -qubit
cluster state |CS〉n,m is the graph state corresponding to an
n × m regular square-lattice graph Gn,m. For such a graph,
N = nm.
In the MBQC framework, given a resource state with graph
G, the standard procedure to perform a computation is to first
identify two sets of qubits {I,O} on G. This procedure de-
fines an open graph G(I,O), such that I,O ⊆ V for a given
3G. The set I corresponds to the input set, while O denotes
the output set. In general, 0 < |I| ≤ |O| ≤ |V|. Note that
the input and output sets can overlap. The complement of I is
written Ic, and similarly, the complement of O is Oc. We also
denote by P (Ic) the power set of all the subsets of elements
in Ic, and we define
Odd(K) := {i : |N (i) ∩K| = 1 mod 2} (2)
as the odd neighborhood of a set of vertices K ⊆ V . In this
work, we are only interested in MBQC protocols that imple-
ment unitary embeddings. Hence for us, |I| = |O| ≤ N .
Intuitively, the state of the qubits in the input set corresponds
to the input state of a computation. Similarly, the qubits in the
output set will contain the quantum information correspond-
ing to the result of the computation once all the qubits in Oc
have been measured. In the process, the quantum information
is transformed by the same principle that governs the general-
ized one-bit teleportation scheme [41, 42].
For our purposes, we restrict the measurements to be pro-
jective measurements in the XY-plane of the Bloch sphere,
denoted Mαjj = {|±α〉〈±α|j} for qubit j, where |±α〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ± eiα|1〉). As a convention, we use bj = 0 for the
measured qubit collapsing to |+α〉j and bj = 1 for collaps-
ing to |−α〉j . The computation to be performed is specified
both by the choice of open graph G(I,O) and by a vector α
specifying the measurement basis αi for each qubit i. Note
that these are the measurements that would be made directly
on the cluster state if all the measurement outcomes were zero
for non-output qubits—i.e., if one were to implement the pos-
itive branch of the MBQC computation. Importantly, by con-
vention, the positive branch corresponds to the target compu-
tation. In general, however, these bases need to be updated
based on outcomes of earlier measurements in order to ensure
the correct computation is performed. The description of the
resource state, the order of measurements, and the dependency
of the measurement bases on previous measurement outcomes
are collectively known as a measurement pattern.
Projective measurements are inherently random in quantum
mechanics, and one needs a procedure to correct for this ran-
domness. We show that this need for adaptation of future mea-
surements based on previous outcomes is what prevents Bob
from knowing the protocol perfectly. Not incidentally, it is
also what circumvents the no-go result from Ref. [37]. This is
because only Alice knows how she is choosing to adapt future
measurement bases dependent on previous measurement out-
comes: Our observation is that different choices of adaptation
strategy correspond to different computations in general.
The structure that determines how to recover determinis-
tic evolution from a MBQC measurement pattern is called g-
flow [43], from generalized quantum-information flow. Rig-
orously, given some resource state |G〉 and a measurement pat-
tern on it, if the associated open graph G(I,O) satisfies cer-
tain g-flow conditions (to be described later), then the pattern
is runnable, and it is also uniformly, strongly, and stepwise
deterministic. This means that each branch of the pattern can
be made equal to the positive branch after each measurement
by application of local corrections, independently of the mea-
surement angles. We use deterministic without ambiguity to
indicate all these attributes. Note also that satisfying the g-
flow conditions is a necessary and sufficient condition for de-
terminism.
In practice, the g-flow assigns a set of local Pauli correc-
tions to a subset of unmeasured qubits after a measurement.
See Ref. [44] for the fine details regarding the practicalities
of g-flow. For simplicity, in the definition of g-flow below
adapted from Ref. [43], we assume all qubits are measured in
the XY-plane of the Bloch sphere. The idea behind g-flow is
to determine whether one can find a correction operator (re-
lated to a correcting set on the graph) that, in the case of a
nonzero measurement outcome, can bring back the quantum
state onto the projection corresponding to the zero outcome.
This is done by applying stabilizer operators on the state. The
g-flow conditions determine whether the geometrical structure
of an open graph allows for these corrections after each mea-
surement.
Definition 1 (G-flow). For an open graph G(I,O), there
exists a g-flow (g,) if one can define a function
g : Oc → P (Ic) and a partial order on V such that ∀i ∈ Oc,
all of the following conditions hold:
(G1) if j ∈ g(i) and j 6= i, then j  i;
(G2) if j  i and i 6= j, then j /∈ Odd(g(i)); and
(G3) i /∈ g(i) and i ∈ Odd(g(i)).
The successor function g(i) indicates what measurements
will be affected by the outcome of the measurement of qubit
i, while the partial order  should be thought of as the causal
order of measurements. The condition (G1) says that if a ver-
tex j is in the correcting set of the vertex i, then j should
be measured after the vertex i. In other words, a correction
should happen after the assigned measurement. Condition
(G2) makes sure that if the correcting set of a vertex i is con-
nected to a vertex j, and j is measured before the vertex i,
then the vertex j should have an even number of connections
with the correcting set of vertex i. Then vertex j receives an
even number of equal Pauli corrections, which is equivalent to
receiving none: hence, no correction can affect earlier correc-
tions. Finally, condition (G3) certifies that each vertex i has
an odd number of connections with its correcting set, such
that a correction is indeed performed on i [44]. In this sense,
the g-flow conditions are understood in terms of geometrical
conditions on the open graph.
Guided by these conditions, for cluster states, here and in
the following, we always adopt the same choice of vertex la-
beling on the graph as shown in Fig. 1. This choice is moti-
vated by our later goal of counting how many choices of open
graphs satisfy the g-flow conditions on a given cluster state.
Since a vertex labeling corresponds to a total order of mea-
surement, it is easy to check that, in order to satisfy the g-flow
conditions, for any vertex i the quantum information can only
move towards the right, move towards the bottom, or stay on
that vertex. Furthermore, condition (G3) imposes that the in-
formation from a vertex cannot move simultaneously towards
the right and towards the bottom. In order to further simplify
the process of counting flows, we introduce an additional cri-
terion, which is not strictly required by g-flow:
4(G4) If k ∈ N (i) ∪N (j), and if k ∈ g(i), then k /∈ g(j).
For Gn,m, as we shall see later, it will prove easier to count
flows satisfying (G1)–(G4) than those satisfying (G1)–(G3).
This process of course only provides a lower bound on the
number of flows rather than the exact number, but will be suf-
ficient for our purposes.
With these four criteria in place, we can define a g-flow
graph path, in this restricted version of g-flow, as an ordered
set of adjacent edges of the graph, starting from an element
of the input set and ending on an element of the output set,
such that for each edge ij of the path, we have j ∈ g(i), with
j  i. Then it follows that (G4) does not allow the g-flow
graph paths to cross. To help the understanding of MBQC,
one could think of a g-flow graph path as a representation of a
wire in the quantum circuit picture. This intuition will be used
later in this work to count how many ways one could define an
open graph with g-flow for our choice of total ordering, which
in turn provides a link to the idea that different open graphs
with g-flow lead to different quantum computations.
III. CLASSICALLY DRIVEN BLIND QUANTUM
COMPUTATION
We start from the situation where Alice wants to obtain the
result of a particular quantum computation. Having no quan-
tum devices of her own, the quantum computation must have
a classical output. We allow Alice to control a probabilis-
tic polynomial-time universal Turing machine (i.e., a classi-
cal computer with access to randomness). Alice has classical
communication lines to and from Bob, the server. Bob has
access to a universal (and noiseless) quantum computer. Bob
could help Alice, but she does not trust him. Alice wishes
to ask Bob to perform a quantum computation for her in a
way that Bob obtains as little information as possible about
her choice of computation. Without loss of generality, we as-
sume that the quantum systems used in the protocol are qubits
(two-level quantum systems [45]). In general, here and in the
following, we denote by
∆A = {ρI , UˆA,M} (3)
the classical description of Alice’s computation, where ρI is
the n-qubit input state of the computation, UˆA is the unitary
embedding that maps ρI to the output state ρO = UˆAρI Uˆ
†
A,
and M is the final set of measurements on ρO required to
extract the classical output. Note that we are implying that
the input state can be efficiently described classically. For
instance, it could be a standard choice of input such as the
n-qubit computational basis ρI = |0〉〈0|⊗n. We also (rather
pedantically) assume that the number of computational steps
is at most polynomial in the input size. Making the process
abstract, Alice’s desired task becomes equal to sampling the
string
p = {pi} = pi(∆A) :=M(UˆAρI Uˆ†A), (4)
where pi is a map that describes the blind operation performed
by the protocol, which outputs the correct probability distri-
Protocol 1 CDBQC(G,A): Classically Driven Blind Quan-
tum Computation
Protocol parameters:
• A graph G with an implicit total ordering of vertices.
• A set of angles A satisfying Eq. (19).
Alice’s input:
• A target computation ∆A implemented using MBQC as
∆MA = {G,α, f},
representing a measurement pattern on G compatible with the
total ordering of measurements implicit in G, which describes
a unitary embedding UˆA. The set α represents a sequence
of N measurement angles over the graph G, with each angle
chosen from a set A, which is also taken to be a parameter
of the protocol and is known to both parties. The g-flow con-
struction f fully determines the input state ρin, through the
location of the input and output qubit sets on the graph (I and
O, respectively) and the dependency sets (sx, sz)
Steps of the protocol:
1. State preparation
(a) Bob prepares the graph state |G〉.
2. Measurements
For i = 1, . . . , N , repeat the following:
(a) Alice picks a binary digit ri ∈ Z2 uniformly at random.
Then, using ri, sx, sz , and the function in Eq. (18), she
computes the angle α′i. Alice transmits α
′
i to Bob.
(b) Bob measures the ith qubit in the basis {|±α′i〉} and
transmits to Alice the measurement outcome b′i ∈ Z2.
(c) Alice records bi = b′i⊕ri in b and then updates the de-
pendency sets (sx, sz). If i ∈ O, then she also records
bi in pCB .
3. Post-processing of the output
(a) Alice implements the final round of corrections on the
output string by calculating p = pC ⊕ sZO , with sZO
the set of Z corrections on the output at the end of the
protocol.
bution {pi} on the joint measurement outcomes given ∆A as
Alice’s delegated target computation. An outline of the proto-
col is presented in Protocol 1.
Let us now introduce the relevant definitions for the vari-
ables used in the protocol and describe the steps thoroughly.
The initial step of the protocol is for Bob to prepare the re-
source state |G〉 that will be used to implement the MBQC.
Once the graph state |G〉 is prepared by Bob, the interactive
part of the protocol starts with Alice communicating to Bob
the angles to be measured, one by one. Because of the ran-
domness introduced by the results of the projective measure-
ments, there exists the possibility that these angles must be
corrected based on the outcomes
b := (b1, ..., bN ) ∈ ZN2 (5)
of Alice’s would-be measurements. Nonetheless, Alice can
5pick a canonical set of angles
α := (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ AN (6)
corresponding to the positive branch case where b = 0. As
discussed earlier, it is possible that the angle for qubit j must
be modified based on the outcomes of the preceding j − 1
measurements, which we denote:
b<j := (b1, . . . , bj−1). (7)
We account for this adaptation in dependency sets
sx := (sx1 , . . . , s
x
N ) ∈ ZN2 , (8)
sz := (sz1, . . . , s
z
N ) ∈ ZN2 , (9)
which depend on the b<j and also on the g-flow construction,
here represented by a bit string
f := (f1, . . . , fM ) ∈ ZM2 (10)
of length M called the flow control bits (or just "flow bits").
At this point, we still have to quantify the value of M . Note,
though, that it represents the number of bits needed to enu-
merate all the possible combinations of input and output that
satisfy the g-flow conditions [43, 46]. Hence, for a fixed total
order of the measurements, it is a function of N . Explicitly,
the X and Z corrections associated with the measurement an-
gle of each qubit j are determined by the dependency sets:
sxj : D[b<j ]×D[f ]→ Z2, (11)
szj : D[b<j ]×D[f ]→ Z2, (12)
where the function D denotes the domain of the argument.
Without loss of generality, we choose sz1 = s
x
1 = 0 since there
are no previous outcomes on which these could depend. For
a fixed open graph G(I,O), the form of the dependency sets
is uniquely defined by the g-flow [4]. Analogously, the flow
bits f fully specify the dependency sets (as functions of b).
As such, the quantum circuit that Alice intends to implement
is specified by the information
(α, f) ∈ AN × ZM2 , (13)
consisting of N measurement angles and M flow bits for a
given graph with fixed total order of measurement. Conse-
quently, once the graph G is known, there exists a one-to-one
correspondence G(I,O)n,m ↔ f , and we can accordingly de-
note the corresponding MBQC measurement pattern as fol-
lows:
∆MA = (Gn,m,α, f). (14)
Explicitly, note that by choosing f , Alice is defining a unique
choice of the input and output on the graph state before the
protocol begins. In line with the computation description from
Eq. (3) we call ρI the input state on G.
We now turn our attention to what kind of information Bob
receives when Alice asks him to perform the measurements
on her behalf. The interactive part of the protocol consists of
N steps. At each step i, Alice requests Bob to measure, in
the XY-plane of the Bloch sphere, the ith qubit, according to
the total order implied by G, and he sends back a bit for each
measurement. We identify the measurement instructions Bob
receives as a list of angles
α′ := (α′1, . . . , α
′
N ) ∈ AN , (15)
and we label the string of bits Alice receives from Bob as
b′ := (b′1, . . . , b
′
N ) ∈ ZN2 , (16)
while remembering that they are communicated alternately
(α′1 to Bob, b
′
1 to Alice, α
′
2 to Bob, b
′
2 to Alice, etc.). Note
that in the case of a dishonest Bob, the string b′ does not need
to correspond to real measurement outcomes but could have
been generated by Bob through some alternative process.
Realizing that measuring α can just as easily be effected by
asking Bob to measure α + pi and then flipping the returned
outcome bit, we introduce a uniformly random N -bit string
r := (r1, . . . , rN ) ∈ ZN2 (17)
that Alice will use to pad the angles in an attempt to conceal
the measurement outcomes. All that remains is to specify how
α′ depends onα. This is specified by the following functional
dependence [16, 46, 47]:
α′ = (−1)sxα+ (sz + r)pi mod 2pi, (18)
which follows from the g-flow construction and shows how
corrections change subsequent measurement angles. Here we
have used multi-index notation to present the result concisely
as a vector. Note that the dependency sets (sx, sz) are updated
by Alice after each measurement. To make the analysis of the
protocol meaningful, we construct a domain for α such that
the domain of all valid α′ is the same. Thus, in general
A = {(−1)xθ + zpi ∣∣ θ ∈ A, x ∈ Z2, z ∈ Z2}. (19)
Also note that now
b′ = b⊕ r, (20)
where ⊕ indicates addition modulo 2 for each bit. We can
identify the data that Bob receives during the interactive part
of the protocol (some from Alice, some from his own mea-
surements) as:
(data Bob receives) := (b′,α′) ∈ ZN2 ×AN . (21)
The interactive part of the protocol ends when all the qubits
have been measured and Alice holds the binary register b,
derived from b′ to account for the one-time pad r. Since Alice
knows the output set O, whenever the ith qubit belongs to
the set of output qubits, Alice saves bi into a second binary
sequence of length |O|:
pCB := (p1, . . . , p|O|) ∈ Z|O|2 , (22)
6where pi = bi, ∀i ∈ O. If Bob is honest, then pCB is equivalent
to pC . At the end of the protocol, this string contains the clas-
sical result of the computation, up to classical post-processing.
This is accounted for by calculating p = pC ⊕ sZO, where sZO
is used to represent the final set of Z corrections on the output
qubits. Clearly, the classical nature of the client allows us to
consider only quantum computations with classical output.
In order for the protocol to have any utility, we require that
the output p satisfies Eq. (4), a property known as correct-
ness. The correctness of this protocol can be proved straight-
forwardly. Note that the positive branch of the MBQC pattern
∆MA [that is, where all the measurement outcomes happen to
be equal to zero (b = 0)] implements Alice’s target computa-
tion ∆A by definition. In the circuit model, this corresponds to
a quantum circuit that implements the unitary UˆA over the cor-
rect input state ρI and a final round of measurements whose
output is the binary string p [48]. Below, we give a proof of
the correctness of the CDBQC protocol.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). For honest Alice and Bob, the out-
come of Protocol 1 is correct.
Proof. There are only two differences between Protocol 1 and
a conventional MBQC implementation of ∆MA . The first is
the use of r to hide measurement outcomes. The effect of r
is to add an additional pi to the measurement angle on certain
qubits, resulting in a bit flip on the corresponding measure-
ment result b′i. However, since this is immediately undone, it
has no effect on the statistics of the measurement results ob-
tained after decoding b.
The other difference is that the g-flow construction, and
hence the dependency sets, is only known to Alice and not
to Bob. However, this does not affect the input state, which
is equivalent to the usual case if Alice is honest (i.e., if
she correctly performs her role in implementing the proto-
col). Furthermore, if Alice updates the measurement an-
gles correctly using the dependency sets as dictated by the
g-flow, and Bob measures them accordingly, every branch of
∆MA is equivalent to the positive branch. Then the measure-
ment pattern correctly implements the unitary transformation
ρout = UˆAρinUˆ
†
A. The protocol also allows Alice to identify
the elements of the output string pC in b, since she knows the
position of the output on the graph. Hence, when both Alice
and Bob follow the protocol, the output string p = pC⊕sZO is
the desired probability distribution that follows from the joint
measurement of the correct quantum output.
IV. BLINDNESS ANALYSIS
We now look at the degree of blindness for a single round
of Protocol 1. In this setting, we consider a cheating Bob with
unbounded computational power, able to deviate from the pro-
tocol and follow any strategy allowed by the laws of physics.
Our aim, however, is not to verify that Bob is indeed perform-
ing the correct quantum computation as requested. Instead,
we want to quantify the amount of information that Bob can
access when Protocol 1 is run only once (stand-alone) and
compare it against the total amount of information needed
to describe the computation. To completely identify Alice’s
computation, Bob needs to know the description ∆MA .
We identify variables with uppercase letters and particu-
lar instances of such variables with lowercase letters. The
probability of a given instance x of a random variable X is
denoted Pr(x), and averaging over X is denoted 〈·〉X or 〈·〉
when there is no ambiguity. Given a random variable X, we
call NX the number of possible outcomes for the variable and
nX := log2NX the number of bits required to enumerate
them.
We denote the Shannon entropy [49] of a random vari-
able X by H(X) := 〈− log2 Pr(x)〉X ≤ nX, with equality
if and only if X is uniformly random. For two random vari-
ables X and Y, their joint entropy is written H(X,Y) :=
〈− log2 Pr(x,y)〉X,Y, and the conditional entropy of X
given Y is H(X|Y) := 〈− log2 Pr(x|y)〉X,Y. These satisfy
H(X|Y) = H(X,Y)−H(Y). (23)
The mutual information of X and Y is
I(X;Y) := H(X) +H(Y)−H(X,Y)
= H(X)−H(X|Y)
= H(Y)−H(Y|X), (24)
which will be our main tool of analysis. Intuitively, I(X;Y)
measures how much information Y has about X. More pre-
cisely, it quantifies how much the entropy of X is reduced, on
average, when the value of Y is known. Because of the sym-
metry of the definition, these statements also hold when the
roles of X and Y are swapped.
Let us call the angles variable A and the flow variable F.
Specifying ∆MA , in general, therefore requires nA + nF bits.
In addition, we use B for the eventual measurement outcomes
and R for the (uniformly random) string of pi-shift bits that is
known only to Alice. In any given run of the protocol, A and
F are drawn from a joint prior probability Pr(α, f), which is
known to Bob. Thus H(A,F) ≤ nA + nF bits, with equality
if and only if the prior is uniform over F and A. Note that we
do not make any assumptions about this prior in what follows.
We have seen before that a single instance of the data Bob
receives at the end of Protocol 1 is equal to (G,b′,α′). In
a stand-alone setting, this is the only data available to Bob
from which he might be able to gain some information about
the circuit chosen by Alice. If this protocol were to be used
as a subroutine or in parallel with another protocol, then one
must analyze the security in a composable framework. Such
an analysis is beyond the scope of the present work and is
left as an open problem. Note that the graph is considered a
parameter of the protocol and not part of Alice’s secret. Bob’s
useful information at the end of a single run of Protocol 1 is
then equal to the mutual information I(B′,A′;A,F) between
the variables associated with the circuit (A,F) and Bob’s data
(B′,A′).
In other words, we are modeling the leakage of informa-
tion as an unintentional classical channel between Alice and
Bob, where (A,F) is the input of the channel and (B′,A′) is
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us how many bits of the original message Bob receives on
average, when averaged over many uses of the channel. Im-
portantly, one cannot recover from mutual information what
bits of the original message are passed to Bob. For our pro-
tocol, the mutual information satisfies the following bound,
which does not rely on any computational assumption but it is
entirely derived from information theory.
Theorem 2 (Blindness). In a single instance of Protocol 1 the
mutual information between the client’s secret input {α, f}
and the information received by the server is bounded by
I(B′,A′;A,F) ≤ H(A′). (25)
Proof. From the definition of mutual information, we have
I(B′,A′;A,F) = H(B′,A′)−H(B′,A′|A,F).
Applying the inequalityH(X,Y) ≤ H(X)+H(Y), together
with the fact that H(B′) ≤ nB′ = N , to the above equation
yields
I(B′,A′;A,F) ≤ H(A′) +N −H(B′,A′|A,F). (26)
What remains to be shown is thatH(B′,A′|A,F) ≥ N . This
result is proved as Lemma 4 in the Appendix A by bounding
Pr(b′,α′|α, f) ≤ 2−N based on the full joint probability for
the protocol. With this bound in place, Eq. (25) directly fol-
lows.
The conditional entropy H(A,F|B′,A′) quantifies the
amount of information that, on average, remains unknown
to Bob about Alice’s computation at the end of Protocol 1.
As mentioned previously, in the case where Alice chooses the
measurement angles A uniformly randomly from a finite set,
one Aj for each qubit, and she chooses the flow F uniformly
randomly from the set of all flows compatible with the total
order implicit in G, then
H(A,F) = nA + nF. (27)
In this case by calculating the conditional entropy
H(A,F|B′,A′) = H(A,F)− I(B′,A′;A,F), (28)
we have H(A,F|B′,A′) ≥ nF because of Theorem 2. Note
that Theorem 2 guarantees zero mutual information for a sin-
gle run of Protocol 1 only if nA = 0, which means only one
choice of measurement angle for each qubit. However, the
structure of the domain of α and α′ [see Eq. (19)] forbids
such a choice. A minimal choice of angles that is not clas-
sically simulable (via the Gottesman-Knill theorem [50]) is
given by
A =
{
pi
4
,
3pi
4
,
5pi
4
,
7pi
4
}
. (29)
In this case, for each angle αj , one has nαj = 2, so nA = 2N .
Since H(A′) ≤ nA′ = nA, Bob gains at most two bits of
information per qubit measured, with this information being a
nontrivial function of both α and f .
FIG. 1: Total order of the measurements for a generic n×m cluster
state used as a resource state in Protocol 1.
V. APPLICATION TO CLUSTER STATES
To conclude the security analysis of the stand-alone sce-
nario, it is necessary to calculate the exact value ofNF, which
in turn gives us the value of nF and hence the lower bound of
the conditional entropy for the case of uniform variables A,F
as explained above. Clearly this depends on the choice of G.
Here, we consider the case of cluster states, where G is taken
to be Gn,m with implicit total ordering of vertices as illustrated
in Fig. 1. Note that M , the length of the bit string f , is equal
to log2NF. When condition (G4) is included, the g-flows we
consider correspond to focused g-flows [51]. Hence, there is
a one-to-one correspondence between an instance of a g-flow
f of F and a choice of input and output set on the graph [51].
Here, we place a lower bound on M by counting flows that
satisfy conditions (G1)–(G4). The use of the additional con-
straint (G4), which is not implicit in the definition of g-flow,
implies that we are undercounting the total number of flows:
hence,
NF ≥ #G(I,O)n,m, (30)
where #G(I,O)n,m corresponds to the number of possible
ways one can define an open graph that satisfies conditions
(G1)–(G4). We now show that this quantity can grow ex-
ponentially in the dimensions of the cluster state such that
nF ∝ N .
Theorem 3. For a cluster state corresponding to Gn,m with
fixed total order as depicted in Fig. 1, the number of different
open graphs G(I,O) satisfying conditions (G1)–(G4) is given
by
#G(I,O)n,m = F |n−m|2min(n,m)+1
min(n,m)∏
µ=2
F 22µ. (31)
where Fi is the ith Fibonacci number.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is somewhat involved. We
begin by considering a set of diagonal cuts across Gn,m, as de-
picted in Fig. 2(a). As we are considering only those flows that
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FIG. 2: (a) A cluster-state graph Gn,m with diagonal cuts imposed.
The flow across each cut is independent, and the number of possible
flows across each cut is indicated. (b) Several cuts with their neigh-
boring vertices isolated.
satisfy condition (G4), there is a straightforward constraint on
the information flow, which can be seen by isolating a single
cut and the vertices linked by edges that the cut passes through
[see Fig. 2(b)]. In the following discussion, we consider only
the vertices connected by edges through which a particular
cut passes. Because of the total ordering imposed on the ver-
tices of Gn,m, conditions (G1)–(G3) ensure that information
can only pass through a cut from the left side to the right side
and not in the reverse direction. Condition (G4) then allows
exactly the set of flows where for any vertex k on the right
side of the cut, information flows to k from at most one of its
neighbors on the left side of the cut. So, if i, j ∈ N (k), then
k /∈ g(i) ∩ g(j).
We divide the cuts into three types: (i) those having one less
neighboring vertex on the left side of the cut than on the right,
(ii) those having one more neighboring vertex on the left side
of the cut than on the right, and (iii) those having an equal
number of neighboring vertices on both sides of the cut. We
label the total number of flows for each type as Aµ, Bµ, and
Cµ, respectively, where µ indicates the number of neighboring
vertices on the left side of the cut, as shown in Fig 2(b).
In order to quantify these, we begin by noting that Aµ =
A→µ + A
6→
µ , where A
→
µ denotes the number of flows with the
restriction that information flows from the uppermost neigh-
boring vertex on the left side of the cut to the uppermost neigh-
boring vertex on the right side of the cut, and A 6→µ denotes the
A
n
A
n-1
A
n-1
= +
A
n
A
n-1
A
n-1
= +
A
n-1
+
FIG. 3: A→µ andA6→µ can be constructed recursively, as shown above.
Here arrows indicate information flow, while edges indicate the pos-
sibility of information flow.
number of flows where this constraint is not satisfied. These
quantities can be calculated using a simple recursion relation,
as follows.
Here,A→µ allows precisely one possibility for flow between
the uppermost vertices of the cut, precluding flow from the
uppermost vertex on the left side of the cut to lower vertices
on the right side. Hence the remaining µ−1 vertices on the left
side and µ − 1 on the right side will be isolated and identical
to the situation where the cut partitions one fewer vertex on
each side. Thus, A→µ = Aµ−1 = A
→
µ−1 +A
6→
µ−1.
Calculating A 6→µ is a little more involved, as there are two
possibilities to consider. The first is that no information flows
from the uppermost vertex on the left side of the cut across
the cut (in which case it is an output). In this case, isolation
of the lower vertices occurs as in the analysis of A→µ ; hence,
there are A→µ−1 + A
6→
µ−1 possible flows. In the second case,
no information can flow into the second uppermost vertex on
the right side of the cut; hence, only A 6→µ−1 flows are possi-
ble. Thus, A 6→µ = A
→
µ−1 + 2A
6→
µ−1 = A
→
µ + A
6→
µ−1. These
correspondences are depicted in Fig. 3.
Note that A→µ and A
6→
µ satisfy the same recursion
relation as the Fibonacci sequence when ordered as
(A→1 , A
6→
1 , A
→
2 , A
6→
2 , . . . ) and starting with A
→
1 = 1 = F2
and A 6→1 = 2 = F3. It follows that Aµ = F2µ+2. By similar
arguments, we have Bµ = F2µ and Cµ = F2µ+1.
It remains only to be noted that the configuration of the in-
formation flow across one cut is independent of the informa-
tion flow across other cuts; hence, the total number of possible
flows is given by the product of the possible flows across each
cut. Therefore,
#G(I,O)n,m =(
min(n,m)−1∏
µ=1
F2µ+2
)
F
|n−m|
2min(n,m)+1
(
min(n,m)∏
ν=2
F2ν
)
, (32)
which simplifies to Eq. (31) as required.
The Fibonacci numbers can be written exactly in terms of
9the golden ratio φ = 12 (1 +
√
5) as
Fk =
φk − (−φ)−k√
5
. (33)
For large cluster states (n,m  1), the number of possible
flows is given by
#G(I,O)n,m ≈ 5−
|n−m|
2 φ(2λ+1)|n−m|
λ∏
ν=2
φ4ν
5
(34)
= 5−
(n+m−2)
2 φ2mn+m+n−4, (35)
where λ = min(n,m). The above approximation is obtained
by noting that Fk ≈ φ
k
√
5
, since
∣∣(−φ)−k∣∣ 1 for large k, and
using this to approximate Eq. (31).
Taking N = nm and assuming m grows polynomially in
n, then m = poly(n), and
#G(I,O)n,m = 22N log2 φ+O(N) (36)
for some  < 1. In such a case, using Eq. (30) and evaluating
to leading order,
nF ≥ log2 #G(I,O)n,m ≈ 1.388N. (37)
This result implies that the conditional entropy
H(A,F|B′,A′) ≥ 1.388N . For the case of a compu-
tation chosen uniformly at random by Alice, the total number
of bits required to entirely describe her computation is
approximately equal to 3.388N . However Bob only receives
exactly 2N bits of information from Alice (the angles α′).
From Theorem 2.1 in Ref. [52], it is easy to verify that
Bob cannot decode Alice’s computation entirely with unit
probability. Additionally, Theorem 2.4 in Ref. [53] shows
that Bob cannot guess Alice’s computation with probability
greater than 2−1.388N .
To make sense of this result, one should remember that a
particular deterministic MBQC computation is characterized
by identifying an input and output set on the underlying graph
of the resource state, together with an information flow con-
struction. This structure determines how the quantum infor-
mation is deterministically transferred via projective measure-
ments from the physical location of the input to the output.
Furthermore, once the input and output systems are fixed on
the graph, the flow, if it can be constructed, is unique. Hence,
in the canonical approach to MBQC, the usual procedure is to
fix the input and the output and assign a partial order of mea-
surements that guarantees determinism under a specific set of
rules. Consequently, the flow construction imposes a total or-
der of measurements, which must respect the partial one.
Here, we have reversed this point of view. As such, Theo-
rem 2 is based on the nontrivial observation that, for a given
MBQC resource state with a fixed total order of measure-
ments, choices of g-flow, i.e. choices of input and output ver-
tices on the graph that correspond to different deterministic
quantum computations, are generally not unique. Nonethe-
less, Alice’s choice of input and output enforces a unique
computation among all the possible choices. This choice of
FIG. 4: A 2 × 2 cluster state with measurement angles {α, β, γ, δ}.
In this example we show how to encode two different computations
using a fixed total order of measurements {1, 2, 3, 4}. The difference
follows from the choice of the G(I,O). In diagram (a), the input set
is {1, 3}, and the output set is {2, 4}, with g-flow function g(1) =
{2}, and g(3) = {4}. The equivalent circuit associated with the
positive branch of this MBQC pattern is shown below. Note that any
final round of corrections is pushed into the classical post-processing
of the output. In diagram (b), the input set is {1, 2}, the output set
is {3, 4}, g(1) = {3}, and g(2) = {4}. Similarly to (a), we show
the circuit of the positive branch of the MBQC pattern, and the final
round of corrections is classically post-processed.
g-flow is not communicated to the server and is kept hidden
by Alice, who uses it to update the classical instructions sent
to Bob. This observation makes it possible for a client to con-
ceal the flow of quantum information from a quantum server
classically instructed on what operations to perform. In par-
ticular, since a large number of other computations are still
compatible with the information Bob receives, the achieved
blindness follows from the ambiguity about the flow of infor-
mation on the graph. Furthermore, our protocol circumvents
the scheme-dependent no-go theorem for classical blind quan-
tum computing stated in Ref. [37]. Here, we do not make use
of any affine encryption on the client’s side, but as mentioned
above, we use flow ambiguity to encode a part of the client’s
computation. As a consequence of this encoding, Protocol 1
requires multiple rounds of communication between the client
and server. This requirement is in direct contrast with the as-
sumptions of Ref. [37], where only one round of communica-
tion is allowed.
We can additionally make two important observations. The
first is that the circuits implementable on Gn,m are not classi-
cally simulable unless BPP = BQP. This stems from the fact
that the cluster state is universal with only XY-plane measure-
ments, as has recently been proven in Ref. [54]. The above
bound provides an exponential lower bound on the number of
consistent flows for all cluster states. The second observation
is that the computations corresponding to different choices of
flow are not equivalent, even when classical post-processing
is allowed. This can most easily be seen by considering an
example. We consider the simplest case of the 2 × 2 plaque-
tte |CS〉2,2. In Fig. 4 we show an example of two different
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choices of open graphs compatible with the underlying total
order of measurements. Both choices satisfy the g-flow con-
ditions and as a result they correspond to two deterministic
MBQC patterns, i.e. two different and well-defined computa-
tions. Since in this particular case the input state (CˆZ |++〉)
is equivalent, the difference is dictated by the unitary trans-
formation (specified by the measurement angles) that acts on
it. As can be seen from Fig. 4, the corresponding circuits
are different and perform different unitaries. Because of the
flow ambiguity and the obfuscation due to the one-time pad,
a quantum server that was to perform the measurements fol-
lowing Protocol 1, at the end of the procedure, would not have
enough information to exactly identify Alice’s choice of open
graph. For G2,2 there are nine possible flow configurations as
expected from Eq. (31), which are depicted in Fig. 5. Given
any fixed transcript of the protocol, for each flow there exists
a choice of α such that it is consistent with the transcript. An
example run of Protocol 1 is presented in Fig. 6 for the G2,2
case.
As a final comment, it is clear that there exist cases where,
for a fixed graph and choice of angles, different choices of
flows will correspond to the same computation. For instance,
referring to Fig. 5, measuring all qubits with the same angle
would give a two-to-one correspondence for some of the com-
putations. However, it is reasonable to conjecture that when
the angles are chosen from sets of large cardinality the map-
ping will be close to one to one. The full characterization of
the mapping is left as an open problem.
FIG. 5: List of the nine possible G(I,O)2,2 combinations (and asso-
ciated patterns) with g-flow for the cluster state |CS〉2,2. The arrows
indicate the direction of the quantum information flow. Note that
overlapping input and output sets are allowed. All the patterns im-
plement unitary embeddings on the input state.
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Alice Bob
b2 = 1
b3 = 0
b4 = 1
∆MA (G2,2,α, f)
sz
sz
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FIG. 6: Illustration of an exemplary run of Protocol 1. At the start of
the protocol, Alice’s computation is expressed as a measurement pat-
tern on a graph, in this case G2,2. This is communicated to Bob, who
prepares the initial state. The computation then proceeds in rounds
with Alice computing the relevant entries of sx and sz and, using
these together with ri, the measurement angle α′i. The measurement
angle α′i is communicated to Bob, who performs the measurement
and returns the result to Alice as b′i. From this, Alice computes bi as
b′i⊕ ri. This process is repeated until all qubits have been measured.
At the end of the protocol, for any fixed transcript of the communi-
cation (composed ofα′ and b′), it is always possible to find a choice
for α consistent with the transcript for any choice of f . In other
words, for any of the possible g-flow configurations shown in Fig. 5,
Bob can find an α that would have led to the transcript he recorded,
which means any of those g-flows is possible. This ambiguity is re-
sponsible for partially hiding Alice’s computation from Bob.
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our overall motivation in this work has been to explore the
possibility of classically driven blind quantum computation.
While this may seem an impossible task, the fact that multiple
nonequivalent computations in the MBQC model can yield
the same transcript of measurement angles and results, even
when the resource state and order of measurements are fixed,
allows the tantalizing possibility that it may be possible for a
classical user to hide a computation from a quantum server.
Protocol 1 makes use of this flow ambiguity to provide some
measure of hiding for quantum computations chosen from cer-
tain restricted sets. Our intention in introducing this protocol
is not to provide a practical cryptographic protocol but rather
to demonstrate that it is indeed possible to hide nonequiv-
alent quantum computations using this flow ambiguity. As
such, we concentrate on showing that in a single run of the
protocol, the amount of information obtained by the server is
bounded, rather than introducing a composable security defi-
nition, which is nontrivial given the dependence of the leaked
information on the responses of the server.
Our results provoke a couple of questions. The first and
most obvious is whether the flow ambiguity effect can be ex-
ploited to hide a universal set of computations even after the
measurement angles have been communicated to the server. A
second, and perhaps even more important question is whether
this phenomenon can be used as a building block for verifica-
tion of quantum computers by completely classical users.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Rafael Alexander, Niel de Beaudrap,
Michal Hajdušek, Elham Kashefi, Simon Perdrix and Car-
los Pérez-Delgado for interesting discussions and valuable in-
sights. T.F.D. thanks Yingkai Ouyang for carefully reading
an early version of this manuscript and for his helpful com-
ments. T.F.D. also thanks his brother Alessandro Demarie
for reminding him why we strive to do science at our best.
J.F.F. acknowledges support from the Air Force Office of Sci-
entific Research under Grant No. FA2386-15-1-4082. N.C.M.
is supported by the Australian Research Council under Grant
No. DE120102204, by the Australian Research Council Cen-
tre of Excellence for Quantum Computation and Communica-
tion Technology (Project No. CE170100012), and by the U.S.
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Qui-
ness program under Grant No. W31P4Q-15-1-0004. This ma-
terial is based on research funded by the Singapore National
Research Foundation under NRF Award NRF-NRFF2013-01.
[1] P. W. Shor, “Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factoriza-
tion and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer,” SIAM
review 41, 303 (1999).
[2] S. Lloyd, “Universal quantum simulators,” Science 273, 1073
(1996).
[3] S. Lloyd, M. Mohseni, and P. Rebentrost, “Quantum algo-
rithms for supervised and unsupervised machine learning,”
arXiv:1307.0411 (2013).
[4] V. Dunjko, J. Fitzsimons, C. Portmann, and R. Renner, Ad-
vances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2014 (Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, 2014).
[5] A. Childs, “Secure assisted quantum computation,” Quant. Inf.
Comp. 5, 456 (2005).
[6] P. Arrighi and L. Salvail, “Blind quantum computation,” Int. J.
Quantum Information 4, 883 (2006).
[7] A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, “Universal blind
quantum computation,” in Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp.
517–526 (2009).
[8] T. Morimae and K. Fujii, “Blind topological measurement-
based quantum com- putation,” Nat. Comm. 3, 1036 (2012).
[9] T. Sueki, T. Koshiba, and T. Morimae, “Ancilla-driven universal
blind quantum computation,” Phys. Rev. A 87, 060301 (2013).
[10] C.-H. Chien, R. V. Meter, and S.-Y. Kuo, “Fault-Tolerant Op-
erations for Universal Blind Quantum Computation,” J. Emerg.
Technol. Comput. Syst. 12, 9:1 (2015).
[11] A. Mantri, C. Perez-Delgado, and J. Fitzsimons, “Optimal blind
quantum computation,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 230502 (2013).
[12] V. Giovannetti, L. Maccone, T. Morimae, and T. Rudolph, “Ef-
ficient universal blind quantum computation,” Phys. Rev. Lett.
111, 230501 (2013).
[13] C. Perez-Delgado and J. Fitzsimons, “Iterated Gate Teleporta-
tion and Blind Quantum Computation,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 114,
220502 (2015).
[14] T. Morimae, “Continuous-variable blind quantum computa-
tion,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 230502 (2012).
[15] V. Dunjko, E. Kashefi, and A. Leverrier, “Blind quantum
computing with weak coherent pulses,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 108,
200502 (2012).
[16] J. F. Fitzsimons and E. Kashefi, “Unconditionally verifiable
blind quantum computation,” Physical Review A 96, 012303
(2017).
[17] M. Hajdušek and C. Perez-Delgado and J. Fitzsimons,
“Device-Independent Verifiable Blind Quantum Computation,”
arXiv:1502.02563v1 (2015).
[18] A. Gheorghiu, E. Kashefi, and P. Wallden, “Robustness and
device independence of verifiable blind quantum computing,”
New J. Phys. 17, 083040 (2015).
[19] T. Morimae and K. Fujii, “Blind quantum computation protocol
in which Alice only makes measurements,” Physical Review A
87, 050301 (2013).
[20] T. Morimae, “Verification for measurement-only blind quantum
computing,” Phys. Rev. A 89, 060302 (2014).
[21] M. Hayashi and T. Morimae, “Verifiable measurement-only
blind quantum computing with stabilizer testing,” Phys. Rev.
Lett. 115, 220502 (2015).
[22] M. Hayashi and M. Hajdusek, “Self-guaranteed measurement-
based quantum computation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.02195
(2016).
[23] S. Barz, E. Kashefi, A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, A. Zeilinger,
and P. Walther, “Demonstration of blind quantum computing,”
Science 335, 303 (2012).
[24] S. Barz, J. Fitzsimons, E. Kashefi, and P. Walther, “Experi-
mental verification of quantum computation,” Nat. Phys. 9, 727
12
(2013).
[25] C. Greganti, M.-C. Roehsner, S. Barz, T. Morimae, and P.
Walther, “Demonstration of measurement-only blind quantum
computing,” New. J. Phys. 18, 013020 (2016).
[26] D. Aharonov, M. Ben-Or, and E. Eban, in Proceedings of In-
novations in Computer Science, (Tsinghua University Press,
2010).
[27] A. Broadbent, “How to verify a quantum computation,”
arXiv:1509.09180 (2015).
[28] B. Reichardt, F. Unger, and U. Vazirani, “Classical command
of quantum systems,” Nature 496, 7446 (2013).
[29] M. McKague, “Interactive Proofs for BQP via Self-Tested
Graph States,” Theory of Computing 12, 1 (2016).
[30] J. F. Fitzsimons and M. Hajdušek, “Post hoc verification of
quantum computation,” arXiv:1512.04375 (2015).
[31] T. Morimae and J. F. Fitzsimons, “Post hoc verification with a
single prover,” arXiv:1603.06046 (2016).
[32] P. Hauke, F. M. Cucchietti, L. Tagliacozzo, I. Deutsch, and M.
Lewenstein, “Can one trust quantum simulators?,” Reports on
Progress in Physics 75, 082401 (2012).
[33] M. Cramer et al., “Efficient quantum state tomography,” Nat
Comms 1, 149 (2010).
[34] L. Aolita, C. Gogolin, M. Kliesch, and J. Eisert, “Reliable quan-
tum certification of photonic state preparations,” Nature Com-
munications 6, 8498 EP (2015).
[35] D. Hangleiter, M. Kliesch, M. Schwarz, and J. Eisert, “Direct
certification of a class of quantum simulations,” Quantum Sci-
ence and Technology 2, 015004 (2017).
[36] M. Walschaers et al., “Statistical benchmark for BosonSam-
pling,” New Journal of Physics 18, 032001 (2016).
[37] T. Morimae and T. Koshiba, “Impossibility of secure cloud
quantum computing for classical client,” arXiv:1407.1636
(2014).
[38] S. Aaronson, A. Cojocaru, A. Gheorghiu, and E. Kashefi, “On
the implausibility of classical client blind quantum computing,”
arXiv:1704.08482v1 (2017).
[39] V. Dunjko and E. Kashefi, “Blind quantum computing with two
almost identical states,” arXiv:1604.01586 (2016).
[40] R. Raussendorf and H. J. Briegel, “A one-way quantum com-
puter,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 5188 (2001).
[41] D. Gottesman and I. L. Chuang, “Demonstrating the viability of
universal quantum computation using teleportation and single-
qubit operations,” Nature (London) 402, 390 (1999).
[42] X. Zhou, D. W. Leung, and I. L. Chuang, “Methodology for
quantum logic gate constructions,” Phys. Rev. A 62, 052316
(2000).
[43] D. Browne, E. Kashefi, M. Mhalla, and S. Perdrix, “Gener-
alized flow and determinism in measurement-based quantum
computation,” New J. Phys. 9, 250 (2007).
[44] D. Markham and E. Kashefi, “Entanglement, Flow and Classi-
cal Simulatability in Measurement Based Quantum Computa-
tion,” arXiv:1311.3610 (2013).
[45] M. Nielsen and I. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quan-
tum Information (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[46] V. Danos and E. Kashefi, “Determinism in the one-way model,”
Phys. Rev. A 74, 052310 (2006).
[47] V. Danos, E. Kashefi, and P. Panangaden, “The measurement
calculus,” Journal of ACM 54, 8 (2007).
[48] R. Raussendorf, D. E. Browne, and H. J. Briegel,
“Measurement-based quantum computation on cluster states,”
Phys. Rev. A 68, 022312 (2003).
[49] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory
(John Wiley & Sons, 2012).
[50] D. Gottesman, “The Heisenberg representation of quantum
computers,” arXiv:9807006 (1998).
[51] M. Mhalla, M. Murao, S. Perdrix, M. Someya, and P. S. Turner,
“Which graph states are useful for quantum information pro-
cessing?,” in Conference on Quantum Computation, Communi-
cation, and Cryptography, pp. 174–187 (2011).
[52] A. Ambainis, A. Nayak, A. Ta-Shma, and U. Vazirani, “Dense
quantum coding and a lower bound for 1-way quantum au-
tomata,” Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium
on Theory of Computing pp. 376–383 (1999).
[53] A. Nayak, “Optimal lower bounds for quantum automata and
random access codes,” Foundations of Computer Science pp.
369,376 (1999).
[54] A. Mantri, T. F. Demarie, and J. F. Fitzsimons, “Universality
of quantum computation with cluster states and (X, Y)-plane
measurements,” Scientific Reports 7, 42861 (2017).
[55] Formal definitions of blindness and verifiability can be found
in [4].
Appendix A: Full joint probability for the protocol and conditional entropy bound
Lemma 4. H(B′,A′|A,F) ≥ N regardless of Bob’s strategy.
Proof. We construct the full joint probability for all of the variables in Protocol 1 and use it to explicitly derive the desired result.
Direct dependencies in the joint probability will be limited by causality and the assumptions that Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories
are secure and free of each others’ espionage. These limitations are as follows:
• The flow bits F and ideal measurement angles A directly depend on no other variables. They are inputs to the problem
chosen by Alice and can be correlated.
• Each pi-shift bit Rj in R is chosen by flipping a fair coin; thus, it directly depends on no other variables.
• Alice assigns A′j based directly on the current Aj , all flow bits F, the current Rj , and any prior decoded bits B<j .
• Each decoded bit Bj directly depends only on Rj (the pi-shift bit) and the bit B′j received from Bob.
• Each bit B′j that Bob returns to Alice directly depends only on the information Bob has on hand at the time (specifically,
B′<j and A
′
≤j), as well as any (classical or quantum) stochastic strategy he wishes to employ.
13
With these direct-dependency limitations, we can immediately write down the form of the full joint probability for the entire
protocol:
Pr(b′,α′,α, f ,b, r) = Pr(α, f)
N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j) Pr(α′j |αj , f ,b<j , rj) Pr(bj |b′j , rj) Pr(rj). (A1)
Furthermore, we can explicitly write several of these probabilities:
Pr(bj |b′j , rj) = δbjb′j⊕rj , (A2)
Pr(α′j |αj , f ,b<j , rj) = δ
α′j
Gj(αj ,f ,b<j ,rj)
, (A3)
Pr(rj) =
1
2
, (A4)
with the deterministic function
Gj(αj , f ,b<j , rj) := (−1)sxj (f ,b<j)αj + piszj (f ,b<j) + pirj mod 2pi (A5)
obtained from Eq. (18). These hold for all j. At this point, we have the most general form of the full joint probability consistent
with the protocol:
Pr(b′,α′,α, f ,b, r) =
Pr(α, f)
2N
δbb′⊕r
N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j)δ
α′j
Gj(αj ,f ,b<j ,rj)
, (A6)
where we have left Bob’s strategy arbitrary but consistent with the direct-dependency restrictions given above. Marginalizing
over B gives
Pr(b′,α′,α, f , r) =
∑
b
Pr(b′,α′,α, f ,b, r) (A7)
=
Pr(α, f)
2N
N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j)δ
α′j
Gj(αj ,f ,b′<j⊕r<j ,rj). (A8)
From this joint probability distribution we can compute
Pr(b′,α′|α, f) =
∑
r
Pr(b′,α′,α, f , r)
Pr(α, f)
(A9)
=
1
2N
∑
r1
· · ·
∑
rN−2
∑
rN−1
∑
rN
N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j)δ
α′j
Gj(αj ,f ,b′<j⊕r<j ,rj) (A10)
=
1
2N
 N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j)
∑
r1
· · ·
∑
rN−2
∑
rN−1
N−1∏
j=1
δ
α′j
Gj(αj ,f ,b′<j⊕r<j ,rj)

×
(
δ
α′N
Gj(αN ,f ,b′<N⊕r<N ,0) + δ
α′N
Gj(αN ,f ,b′<N⊕r<N ,1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
at most one term is nonzero
(A11)
≤ 1
2N
 N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j)
∑
r1
· · ·
∑
rN−2
∑
rN−1
N−1∏
j=1
δ
α′j
Gj(αj ,f ,b′<j⊕r<j ,rj) (A12)
≤ 1
2N
 N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j)
∑
r1
· · ·
∑
rN−2
N−2∏
j=1
δ
α′j
Gj(αj ,f ,b′<j⊕r<j ,rj) (A13)
...
≤ 1
2N
 N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j)
∑
r1
δ
α′1
G1(α1,f ,r1)
(A14)
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≤ 1
2N
N∏
j=1
Pr(b′j |b′<j ,α′≤j) (A15)
≤ 1
2N
(A16)
In the above, we have repeatedly used the fact that Gj has at most one rj that makes it equal to α′j for any given (αj , f ,b<j).
Therefore, substituting the above bound into the conditional entropy formula gives
H(B′,A′|A,F) =
∑
α,f
Pr(α, f)H(B′,A′|A = α,F = f) ≥
∑
α,f
Pr(α, f)N = N, (A17)
which was to be proven.
